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Abstract
Deep Neural Network (DNN) classifiers are vulnerable
to adversarial attack, where an imperceptible perturbation
could result in misclassification. However, the vulnerabil-
ity of DNN-based image ranking systems remains under-
explored. In this paper, we propose two attacks against deep
ranking systems, i.e., Candidate Attack and Query Attack,
that can raise or lower the rank of chosen candidates by ad-
versarial perturbations. Specifically, the expected ranking
order is first represented as a set of inequalities, and then a
triplet-like objective function is designed to obtain the op-
timal perturbation. Conversely, a defense method is also
proposed to improve the ranking system robustness, which
can mitigate all the proposed attacks simultaneously. Our
adversarial ranking attacks and defense are evaluated on
datasets including MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and Stanford-
Online-Products. Experimental results demonstrate that a
typical deep ranking system can be effectively compromised
by our attacks. Meanwhile, the system robustness can be
moderately improved with our defense. Furthermore, the
transferable and universal properties of our adversary il-
lustrate the possibility of realistic black-box attack.
1. Introduction
Despite the successful application in computer vision
tasks such as image classification [35, 25], Deep Neural
Networks (DNNs) have been found vulnerable to adversar-
ial attacks. In particular, the DNN’s prediction can be arbi-
trarily changed by just applying an imperceptible perturba-
tion to the input image [75, 21]. Moreover, such adversarial
attacks can effectively compromise the recent state-of-the-
art DNNs such as Inception [73, 74] and ResNet [25]. This
poses a serious security risk on many DNN-based applica-
tions such as face recognition, where recognition evasion or
impersonation can be easily achieved [15, 70, 34, 78].
Previous adversarial attacks primarily focus on classifi-
cation, however, we speculate that DNN-based image rank-
ing systems [5, 8, 76, 33, 56, 19, 39] also suffer from simi-
lar vulnerability. Taking the image-based product search as
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Figure 1. Adversarial ranking attack that can raise or lower the
rank of chosen candidates by adversarial perturbations. In Candi-
date Attack, adversarial perturbation is added to the candidate and
its rank is raised (CA+) or lowered (CA-). In Query Attack, ad-
versarial perturbation is added to the query image, and the ranks
of chosen candidates are raised (QA+) or lowered (QA-).
an example, a fair ranking system should rank the database
products according to their visual similarity to the query, as
shown in Fig. 1 (row 1). Nevertheless, a malicious seller
may attempt to raise the rank of his/her own product by
adding perturbation to the image (CA+, row 2), or lower
the rank of his competitor’s product (CA-, row 3); Besides,
a “man-in-the-middle” attacker (e.g., a malicious advertis-
ing company) could hijack and imperceptibly perturb the
query image in order to promote (QA+, row 4) or impede
(QA-, row 5) the sales of specific products.
Unlike classification tasks where images are predicted
independently, the rank of one candidate is related to the
query as well as other candidates for image ranking. The
relative relations among candidates and queries determine
the final ranking order. Therefore, we argue that the existing
adversarial classification attacks are incompatible with the
ranking scenario. Thus, we need to thoroughly study the
adversarial ranking attack.
In this paper, adversarial ranking attack aims to raise
or lower the ranks of some chosen candidates C =
{c1, c2, . . . , cm} with respect to a specific query set Q =
{q1, q2, . . . , qw}. This can be achieved by either Candidate
Attack (CA) or Query Attack (QA). In particular, CA is de-
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fined as to raise (abbr. CA+) or lower (abbr. CA-) the rank
of a single candidate c with respect to the query set Q by
perturbing c itself; while QA is defined as to raise (abbr.
QA+) or lower (abbr. QA-) the ranks of a candidate set C
with respect to a single query q by perturbing q. Thus, ad-
versarial ranking attack can be achieved by performing CA
on each c ∈ C, or QA on each q ∈ Q. In practice, the choice
of CA or QA depends on the accessibility to the candidate
or query respectively, i.e., CA is feasible for modifiable can-
didate, while QA is feasible for modifiable query.
An effective implementation of these attacks is proposed
in this paper. As we know, a typical DNN-based ranking
model maps objects (i.e., queries and candidates) to a com-
mon embedding space, where the distances among them de-
termine the final ranking order. Predictably, the object’s po-
sition in the embedding space will be changed by adding
a perturbation to it. Therefore, the essential of adversarial
ranking attack is to find a proper perturbation, which could
push the object to a desired position that leads to the ex-
pected ranking order. Specifically, we first represent the ex-
pected ranking order as a set of inequalities. Subsequently, a
triplet-like objective function is designed according to those
inequalities, and combined with Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD) to efficiently obtain the desired adversarial perturba-
tion.
Opposed to the proposed attacks, adversarial ranking
defense is worth being investigated especially for security-
sensitive deep ranking applications. Until now, the Madry
defense [50] is regarded as the most effective method for
classification defense. However, we empirically discovered
a primary challenge of diverging training loss while directly
adapting such mechanism for ranking defense, possibly due
to the generated adversarial examples being too “strong”. In
addition, such defense mechanism needs to defend against
distinct ranking attacks individually, but a generic defense
method against all CA+, CA-, QA+ and QA- attacks is pre-
ferred.
To this end, a shift-distance based ranking defense is pro-
posed, which could simultaneously defend against all at-
tacks. Note that the position shift of objects in the embed-
ding space is the key for all ranking attacks. Although dif-
ferent attacks prefer distinct shift directions (e.g., CA+ and
CA- often prefer opposed shifting directions), a large shift
distance is their common preference. If we could reduce the
shift distance of embeddings incurred by adversarial pertur-
bation, all attacks can be simultaneously defensed. Specifi-
cally, we first propose a shift-distance based ranking attack,
which aims to push the objects as far from their original po-
sitions as possible. And then, the adversarial examples gen-
erated from such attack is involved in the adversarial train-
ing. Experimental results manifest that our ranking defense
can converge and moderately improve model robustness.
In addition, our ranking attacks have some good proper-
ties for realistic applications. First, our adversary is trans-
ferable, i.e., the adversary obtained from a known DNN
ranker can be directly used to attack an unknown DNN
ranker (i.e., the network architecture and parameters are un-
known). Second, our attacks can be extended to universal
ranking attacks with slight performance drop, i.e., we could
learn a universal perturbation to all candidates for CA, or a
universal perturbation to all queries for QA. Such properties
illustrate the possibility of practical black-box attack.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
thoroughly studies the adversarial ranking attack and de-
fense. In brief, our contributions are:
1. The adversarial ranking attack is defined and imple-
mented, which can intentionally change the ranking re-
sults by perturbing the candidates or queries.
2. An adversarial ranking defense method is proposed to
improve the ranking model robustness, and mitigate all
the proposed attacks simultaneously.
2. Related Works
Adversarial Attacks. Szegedy et al. [75] claimed that
DNN is susceptible to imperceptible adversarial perturba-
tions added to inputs, due to the intriguing “blind spot”
property, which was later ascribed to the local linearity [21]
of neural networks. Following these findings, many white-
box (model architecture and parameters are known to the
adversary) attacking methods [54, 61, 36, 7, 10, 13, 66, 72,
50, 80, 9, 20] are proposed to effectively compromise the
state-of-the-art DNN classifiers. Among them, PGD [50] is
regarded as one of the most powerful attacks [2]. Notably,
adversarial examples are discovered to be transferable [60,
59] among different neural network classifiers, which in-
spired a series of black-box attacks [71, 79, 83, 45, 14, 28].
On the other hand, universal (i.e., image-agnostic) adver-
sarial perturbations are also discovered [53, 41]. The exis-
tence of adversarial examples stimulated research interests
in areas such as object detection [48, 11, 85], semantic seg-
mentation [1], and automatic speech recognition [65], etc.
It is even possible to create physical adversarial examples
[70, 4, 18, 78].
Deep Ranking. Different from the traditional “learning
to rank” [42, 31] methods, DNN-based ranking methods of-
ten embed data samples (including both queries and candi-
dates) of all modalities into a common embedding space,
and subsequently determine the ranking order based on dis-
tance. Such workflow has been adopted in distance metric
learning [8, 76, 57, 30], image retrieval [5], cross-modal re-
trieval [56, 19, 39, 33], and face recognition [67].
Adversarial Attacks in Deep Ranking. For informa-
tion retrieval and ranking systems, the risk of malicious
users manipulating the ranking always exists [23, 27]. How-
ever, only a few research efforts have been made in ad-
versarial attacks in deep ranking. Liu et al. [46] pro-
posed adversarial queries leading to incorrect retrieval re-
sults; while Li et al. [40] staged similar attack with universal
perturbation that corrupts listwise ranking results. None of
the aforementioned research efforts explore the adversar-
ial ranking attack. Besides, adaptation of distance-based
attacks (e.g. [66]) are unsuitable for our scenario.
Adversarial Defenses. Adversarial attacks and de-
fenses are consistently engaged in an arms race [84]. Gra-
dient masking-based defenses can be circumvented [3].
Defensive distillation [58, 62] has been compromised by
C&W [7, 6]. As claimed in [26], ensemble of weak de-
fenses are insufficient against adversarial examples. No-
tably, as an early defense method [75], adversarial train-
ing [21, 50, 29, 16, 37, 69, 77, 86, 55] remains to be one
of the most effective defenses. Other types of defenses
include adversarial detection [47, 52], input transforma-
tion/reconstruction/replacement [64, 49, 24, 51, 17], ran-
domization [44, 43], feature denoising [82], network verifi-
cation [32, 22], evidential deep learning [68], etc. However,
defense in deep ranking systems remains mostly uncharted.
3. Adversarial Ranking
Generally, a DNN-based ranking task could be formu-
lated as a metric learning problem. Given the query q and
candidate setX = {c1, c2, . . . , cn}, deep ranking is to learn
a mapping f (usually implemented as a DNN) which maps
all candidates and query into a common embedding space,
such that the relative distances among the embedding vec-
tors could satisfy the expected ranking order. For instance,
if candidate ci is more similar to the query q than candidate
cj , it is encouraged for the mapping f to satisfy the inequal-
ity ‖f(q)− f(ci)‖ < ‖f(q)− f(cj)‖1, where ‖ · ‖ denotes
`2 norm. For brevity, we denote ‖f(q) − f(ci)‖ as d(q, ci)
in following text.
Therefore, adversarial ranking attack is to find a proper
adversarial perturbation which leads the ranking order to
be changed as expected. For example, if a less relevant
cj is expected to be ranked ahead of a relevant ci, it is
desired to find a proper perturbation r to perturb cj , i.e.
c˜j = cj + r, such that the inequality d(q, ci) < d(q, cj)
could be changed into d(q, ci) > d(q, c˜j). In the next, we
will describe Candidate Attack and Query Attack in detail.
3.1. Candidate Attack
Candidate Attack (CA) aims to raise (abbr. CA+) or
lower (abbr. CA-) the rank of a single candidate c with
respect to a set of queries Q = {q1, q2, . . . , qw} by adding
perturbation r to the candidate itself, i.e. c˜ = c+ r.
Let RankX(q, c) denote the rank of the candidate c with
respect to the query q, whereX indicates the set of all candi-
1Sometimes cosine distance is used instead.
dates, and a smaller rank value represents a higher ranking.
Thus, the CA+ that raises the rank of cwith respect to every
query q ∈ Q by perturbation r could be formulated as the
following problem,
r = arg min
r∈Γ
∑
q∈Q
RankX(q, c+ r), (1)
Γ = {r∣∣‖r‖∞ 6 ε; r, c+ r ∈ [0, 1]N}, (2)
where Γ is a `∞-bounded ε-neighbor of c, ε ∈ [0, 1] is a
predefined small positive constant, the constraint ‖r‖∞ 6 ε
limits the perturbation r to be “visually imperceptible”, and
c + r ∈ [0, 1]N ensures the adversarial example remains
a valid input image. Although alternative “imperceptible”
constraints exist (e.g., `0 [72, 12], `1 [10] and `2 [7, 54]
variants), we simply follow [21, 36, 50] and use the `∞ con-
straint.
However, the optimization problem Eq. (1)–(2) cannot
be directly solved due to the discrete nature of the rank value
RankX(q, c). In order to solve the problem, a surrogate ob-
jective function is needed.
In metric learning, given two candidates cp, cn ∈ X
where cp is ranked ahead of cn, i.e. RankX(q, cp) <
RankX(q, cn), the ranking order is represented as an in-
equality d(q, cp) < d(q, cn) and formulated in triplet loss:
Ltriplet(q, cp, cn) = [β + d(q, cp)− d(q, cn)]+ , (3)
where [·]+ denotes max(0, ·), and β is a manually defined
constant margin. This function is known as the triplet (i.e.
pairwise ranking) loss [8, 67].
Similarly, the attacking goal of CA+ in Eq. (1) can be
readily converted into a series of inequalities, and subse-
quently turned into a sum of triplet losses,
LCA+(c,Q;X) =
∑
q∈Q
∑
x∈X
[
d(q, c)− d(q, x)]
+
. (4)
In this way, the original problem in Eq. (1)–(2) can be refor-
mulated into the following constrained optimization prob-
lem:
r = arg min
r∈Γ
LCA+(c+ r,Q;X). (5)
To solve the optimization problem, Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD) method [50, 36] (a.k.a the iterative ver-
sion of FGSM [21]) can be used. Note that PGD is one of
the most effective first-order gradient-based algorithms [2],
popular among related works about adversarial attack.
Specifically, in order to find an adversarial perturbation
r to create a desired adversarial candidate c˜ = c + r, the
PGD algorithm alternates two steps at every iteration t =
1, 2, . . . , η. Step one updates c˜ according to the gradient of
Eq. (4); while step two clips the result of step one to fit in
the ε-neighboring region Γ:
c˜t+1 = Clipc,Γ
{
c˜t − αsign(∇c˜tLCA+(c˜t, Q,X))
}
, (6)
where α is a constant hyper-parameter indicating the PGD
step size, and c˜1 is initialized as c. After η iterations, the de-
sired adversarial candidate c˜ is obtained as c˜η , which is op-
timized to satisfy as many inequalities as possible. Each in-
equality represents a pairwise ranking sub-problem, hence
the adversarial candidate c˜ will be ranked ahead of other
candidates with respect to every specified query q ∈ Q.
Likewise, the CA- that lowers the rank of a candidate c
with respect to a set of queries Q can be obtained in similar
way:
LCA-(c,Q;X) =
∑
q∈Q
∑
x∈X
[− d(q, c) + d(q, x)]
+
. (7)
3.2. Query Attack
Query Attack (QA) is supposed to raise (abbr. QA+)
or lower (abbr. QA-) the rank of a set of candidates C =
{c1, c2, . . . , cm} with respect to the query q, by adding ad-
versarial perturbation r to the query q˜ = q + r. Thus, QA
and CA are two “symmetric” attacks. The QA- for lowering
the rank could be formulated as follows:
r = arg max
r∈Γ
∑
c∈C
RankX(q + r, c), (8)
where Γ is the ε-neighbor of q. Likewise, this attacking
objective can also be transformed into the following con-
strained optimization problem:
LQA-(q, C;X) =
∑
c∈C
∑
x∈X
[− d(q, c) + d(q, x)]
+
, (9)
r = arg min
r∈Γ
LQA-(q + r, C;X), (10)
and it can be solved with the PGD algorithm. Similarly,
the QA+ loss function LQA+ for raising the rank of c is as
follows:
LQA+(q, C;X) =
∑
c∈C
∑
x∈X
[
d(q, c)− d(q, x)]
+
. (11)
Unlike CA, QA perturbs the query image, and hence
may drastically change its semantics, resulting in abnormal
retrieval results. For instance, after perturbing a “lamp”
query image, some unrelated candidates (e.g., “shelf”,
“toaster”, etc.) may appear in the top return list. Thus, an
ideal query attack should preserve the query semantics, i.e.,
the candidates in X \ C 2 should retain their original ranks
if possible. Thus, we propose the Semantics-Preserving
Query Attack (SP-QA) by adding the SP term to mitigate
the semantic changes q, e.g.,
LSP-QA-(q, C;X) = LQA-(q, C;X) + ξLQA+(q, CSP;X), (12)
where CSP =
{
c ∈ X \ C|RankX\C(q, c) 6 G
}
, i.e., CSP
contains the top-G most-relevant candidates corresponding
2The complement of the set C.
to q, and the LQA+(q, CSP;X) term helps preserve the query
semantics by retaining some CSP candidates in the retrieved
ranking list. Constant G is a predefined integer; and con-
stant ξ is a hyper-parameter for balancing the attack effect
and semantics preservation. Unless mentioned, in the fol-
lowing text QA means SP-QA by default.
3.3. Robustness & Defense
Adversarial defense for classification has been exten-
sively explored, and many of them follows the adversarial
training mechanism [29, 37, 50]. In particular, the adversar-
ial counterparts of the original training samples are used to
replace or augment the training samples. Until now, Madry
defense [50] is regarded as the most effective [77, 3] ad-
versarial training method. However, when directly adapting
such classification defense to improve ranking robustness,
we empirically discovered a primary challenge of diverging
training loss, possibly due to the generated adversarial ex-
amples being too “strong”. Moreover, such defense mech-
anism needs to defend against distinct attacks individually.
Therefore, a generic defense against all the proposed attacks
is preferred.
Note that the underlying principle of adversarial ranking
attack is to shift the embeddings of candidates/queries to
a proper place, and a successful attack depends on a large
shift distance as well as a correct shift direction. A large
shift distance is an indispensable objective for all the CA+,
CA-, QA+ and QA- attacks. Predictably, a reduction in
shift distance could improve model robustness against all
attacks simultaneously.
To this end, we propose a “maximum-shift-distance” at-
tack that pushes an embedding vector as far from its original
position as possible (resembles Feature Adversary [66] for
classification), r = arg maxr∈Γ d(c+r, c). Then we use ad-
versarial examples obtained from this attack to replace orig-
inal training samples for adversarial training, hence reduce
the shift distance incurred by adversarial perturbations.
A ranking model can be normally trained with the defen-
sive version of the triplet loss:
Ld-t(q, cp, cn) = Ltriplet
(
q + argmax
r∈Γ
d(q + r, q),
cp + argmax
r∈Γ
d(cp + r, cp),
cn + argmax
r∈Γ
d(cn + r, cn)
)
. (13)
Unlike the direct adaptation of Madry defense, the training
loss does converge in our experiments.
4. Experiments
To validate the proposed attacks and defense, we
use three commonly used ranking datasets including
MNIST [38], Fashion-MNIST [81], and Stanford Online
ε
CA+ CA- QA+ QA-
w = 1 2 5 10 w = 1 2 5 10 m = 1 2 5 10 m = 1 2 5 10
(CT) Cosine Distance, Triplet Loss (R@1=99.1%)
0 50 50 50 50 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 44.6 45.4 47.4 47.9 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.1 45.2 46.3 47.7 48.5 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6
0.03 33.4 37.3 41.9 43.9 6.3 5.9 5.7 5.6 35.6 39.2 43.4 45.8 1.9 1.4 1.1 1.1
0.1 12.7 17.4 24.4 30.0 15.4 14.9 14.8 14.7 14.4 21.0 30.6 37.2 5.6 4.4 3.7 3.5
0.3 2.1 9.1 13.0 17.9 93.9 93.2 93.0 92.9 6.3 11.2 22.5 32.1 8.6 6.6 5.3 4.8
Table 1. Adversarial ranking attack on vanilla model with MNIST.
The “+” attacks (i.e. CA+ and QA+) raise the rank of chosen can-
didates towards 0 (%); while the “-” attacks (i.e. CA- and QA-)
lower the ranks of chosen candidates towards 100 (%). Applying
ε = 0.01, 0.03, 0.1, 0.3 QA+ attacks on the model, the SP term
keeps the ranks of CSP no larger than 3.6%, 5.7%, 7.7%, 7.7%,
respectively, regardless of m. With the QA- counterpart, the ranks
of CSP are kept no larger than 1.6%, 1.6%, 1.5%, 1.5%, respec-
tively, regardless of m. For all the numbers in the table, “%” is
omitted.
Product (SOP) [57]. We respectively train models on these
datasets with PyTorch [63], and conduct attacks 3 on their
corresponding test datasets (used as X).
Evaluation Metric. Adversarial ranking attack aims to
change the ranks of candidates. For each candidate c, its
normalized rank is calculated as R(q, c) = RankX(q,c)|X| ×
100% where c ∈ X , and |X| is the length of full ranking
list. Thus, R(q, c) ∈ [0, 1], and a top ranked c will have a
small R(q, c). The attack effectiveness can be measured by
the magnitude of change in R(q, c).
Performance of Attack. To measure the performance
of a single CA attack, we average the rank of candidate c
across every query q ∈ Q, i.e.,RCA(c) =
∑
q∈QR(q, c)/w.
Similarly, the performance of a single QA attack can be
measured by the average rank across every candidate c ∈ C,
i.e., RQA(q) =
∑
c∈C R(q, c)/m. For the overall perfor-
mance of an attack, we conduct T times of independent at-
tacks and report the mean of RCA(c) or RQA(q), accord-
ingly.
CA+ & QA+. For CA+, the query set Q is randomly
sampled from X . Likewise, for QA+, the candidate set C is
from X . Without attack, both the RCA(c) and RQA(q) will
approximate to 50%, and the attacks should significantly
decrease the value.
CA- & QA-. In practice, the Q for CA- and the C
for QA- cannot be randomly sampled, because the two
attacks are often to lower some top ranked candidates.
Thus, the two sets should be selected from the top ranked
samples (top-1% in our experiments) in X . Formally,
given the candidate c for CA-, we randomly sample the
w queries from {q ∈ X|R(c, q) 6 1%} as Q. Given the
query q for QA-, m candidates are randomly sampled from
{c ∈ X|R(q, c) 6 1%} as C. Without attack, both the
RCA(c) and RQA(q) will be close to 0%, and the attacks
should significantly increase the value.
Hyper-Parameters. We conduct CA with w ∈
3Specifically, we use PGD without random starts [50].
ε
CA+ CA- QA+ QA-
w = 1 2 5 10 w = 1 2 5 10 m = 1 2 5 10 m = 1 2 5 10
(CTD) Cosine Distance, Triplet Loss, Defensive (R@1=98.3%)
0 50 50 50 50 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 48.9 49.3 49.4 49.5 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 49.9 49.5 49.5 49.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.03 47.4 48.4 48.6 48.9 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 48.0 48.5 49.2 49.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
0.1 42.4 44.2 45.9 46.7 3.8 3.6 3.5 3.4 43.2 45.0 47.4 48.2 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7
0.3 30.7 34.5 38.7 40.7 7.0 6.7 6.5 6.5 33.2 37.2 42.3 45.1 2.4 1.9 1.6 1.5
Table 2. Adversarial ranking defense with MNIST. Applying ε =
0.01, 0.03, 0.1, 0.3 QA+ attacks on model, the ranks of candidates
in CSP are kept no larger than 0.5%, 0.5%, 0.5%, 0.5%, respec-
tively, regardless of m. With the QA- counterpart, the ranks of
CSP are kept less than 0.4%, 0.4%, 0.4%, 0.4%, respectively, re-
gardless of m.
{1, 2, 5, 10} queries, and QA with m ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10} can-
didates, respectively. In QA, we let G = 5. The SP
balancing parameter ξ is set to 1 for QA+ , and 102
for QA-. In addition, We investigate attacks of different
strength ε, i.e. 0.01, 0.03, 0.1, 0.3 on MNIST and Fashion-
MNIST following [50], and 0.01, 0.03, 0.06 on SOP follow-
ing [37]. The PGD step size is empirically set to α =
min(max( ε10 ,
1
255 ), 0.01), and the number of PGD itera-
tions to η = min(max(10, 2εα ), 30). We perform T = |X|
times of attack to obtain the reported performance.
Adversarial Defense. Ranking models are trained using
Eq. (13) with the strongest adversary following the proce-
dure of Madry defense [50].
4.1. MNIST Dataset
Following conventional settings with the MNIST [38]
dataset, we train a CNN ranking model comprising 2 con-
volutional layers and 1 fully-connected layer. This CNN
architecture (denoted as C2F1) is identical to the one used
in [50] except for the removal of the last fully-connected
layer. Specifically, the ranking model is trained with cosine
distance and triplet loss. The retrieval performance of the
model is Recall@1=99.1% (R@1), as shown in Tab. 1 in
grey highlight.
Attacking results against this vanilla model (i.e., the
ranking model which is not enhanced with our defense
method) are presented in Tab. 1. For example, a strong CA+
attack (i.e., ε = 0.3) for w = 1 can raise the rank RCA(c)
from 50% to 2.1%. Likewise, the rank of C can be raised
to 9.1%, 13.0%, 17.9% for w = 2, 5, 10 chosen queries,
respectively.
On the other hand, a strong CA- attack for w = 1 can
lower the rank RCA(c) from 2.1% to 93.9%. The results of
strong CA- attacks for w = 2, 5, 10 are similar to the w = 1
case.
The results of QA+ and QA- are also shown in Tab. 1.
the rank changes with QA attacks are less dramatic (but still
significant) than CA. This is due to the additional difficulty
introduced by SP term in Eq. (12), and the QA attack effec-
tiveness is inversely correlated with ξ. For instance, a strong
QA- for m = 1 can only lower the rank RQA(q) from 0.5%
Figure 2. Comparison of Attacks on vanilla and defensive mod-
els. Apart from the ranks of chosen candidates, We also measure
the maximum shift distance of embedding vectors that adversarial
perturbation could incur.
to 8.6%, but the attacking effect can be further boosted by
decreasing ξ. More experimental results are presented in
following discussion. In brief, our proposed attacks against
the vanilla ranking model is effective.
Next, we evaluate the performance of our defense
method. Our defense should be able to enhance the ro-
bustness of a ranking model, which can be measured by
the difference between the attack effectiveness with our de-
fense and the attack effectiveness without our defense. As
a common phenomenon of adversarial training, our defense
mechanism leads to a slight retrieval performance degrada-
tion for unperturbed input (highlighted in blue in Tab. 2),
but the attacking effectiveness is clearly mitigated by our
defense. For instance, the same strong CA+ attack for
w = 1 on the defensive model (i.e., the ranking model
which is enhanced by our defense method) can only raise
the rankRCA(c) from 50% to 30.7%, compared to its vanilla
counterpart raising to 2.1%. Further analysis suggests that
the weights in the first convolution layer of the defensive
model are closer to 0 and have smaller variance than those
of the vanilla model, which may help resist adversarial per-
turbation from changing the layer outputs into the local lin-
ear area of ReLU [21].
To visualize the effect of our attacks and defense, we
track the attacking effect with ε varying from 0.0 to 0.3 on
the vanilla and defensive models, as shown in Fig. 2. It
is noted that our defense could significantly suppress the
maximum embedding shift distance incurred by adversarial
perturbation to nearly 0, but the defensive model is still not
completely immune to attacks. We speculate the defensive
model still has “blind spots” [75] in some local areas that
could be exploited by the attacks.
In summary, these results and further experiments sug-
gest that: (1) deep ranking models are vulnerable to ad-
versarial ranking attacks, no matter what loss function or
distance metric is selected; (2) vanilla models trained with
contrastive loss are more robust than those trained with
triplet loss. This is possibly due to contrastive loss explic-
itly reducing the intra-class embedding variation. Addition-
ε
CA+ CA- QA+ QA-
w = 1 2 5 10 w = 1 2 5 10 m = 1 2 5 10 m = 1 2 5 10
(CT) Cosine Distance, Triplet Loss (R@1=88.8%)
0 50 50 50 50 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 36.6 39.9 43.2 44.8 5.6 5.1 4.9 4.8 39.4 42.0 45.3 47.1 2.1 1.6 1.2 1.1
0.03 19.7 25.4 31.7 35.6 15.5 14.8 14.4 14.3 21.7 28.2 35.7 40.6 5.6 4.1 3.3 2.9
0.1 3.7 10.5 17.3 22.7 87.2 86.7 86.3 86.3 7.1 12.4 23.6 32.5 10.9 8.3 6.7 6.0
0.3 1.3 9.4 16.0 21.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 6.3 10.8 21.8 31.7 12.6 9.4 7.5 6.6
(CTD) Cosine Distance, Triplet Loss, Defensive (R@1=79.6%)
0 50 50 50 50 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 48.9 48.9 49.3 49.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 49.4 49.9 49.9 50.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.03 47.1 47.9 48.3 48.3 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 48.3 49.1 49.5 49.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
0.1 42.4 43.5 44.5 44.8 4.6 4.2 4.0 3.9 45.4 47.2 48.7 49.2 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1
0.3 32.5 35.4 37.5 38.2 11.2 10.5 10.1 10.0 39.3 42.6 46.5 47.8 3.9 3.3 3.0 2.9
Table 3. Adversarial ranking attack and defense on Fashion-
MNIST. The lowest ranks of CSP are 3.0%, 5.2%, 7.8%, 8.3% in
QA+, and 1.9%, 1.9%, 1.9%, 1.8% for QA+, respectively.
ally, our defense method could consistently improve the ro-
bustness of all these models; (3) different distance metrics
have almost negligible contribution on robustness. Specif-
ically, Euclidean distance-based models are slightly more
susceptible to weak (e.g., ε = 0.03) attacks; (4) Euclidean
distance-based models are harder to defend than cosine
distance-based ones. Beyond these experiments, we also
find that the margin hyper-parameter β of triplet loss and
the dimensionality of the embedding space have marginal
influences on model robustness.
4.2. Fashion-MNIST Dataset
Fashion-MNIST [81] is an MNIST-like but more difficult
dataset, comprising 60, 000 training examples and 10, 000
test samples. The samples are 28 × 28 greyscale images
covering 10 different fashion product classes, including “T-
shirt” and “dress”, etc. We train the vanilla and defensive
models based on the cosine distance and triplet loss and
conduct attack experiments.
The attack and defense results are available in Tab. 3.
From the table, we note that our attacks could achieve bet-
ter effect compared to experiments on MNIST. For example,
in a strong CA+ for w = 1, the rank RCA(c) can be raised
to 1.3%. On the other hand, despite the moderate improve-
ment in robustness, the defensive model performs worse in
unperturbed sample retrieval, as expected. The performance
degradation is more pronounced on this dataset compared to
MNIST. We speculate the differences are related to the in-
creased dataset difficulty.
4.3. Stanford Online Products Dataset
Stanford Online Products (SOP) dataset [57] contains
120k images of 23k classes of real online products from
eBay for metric learning. We use the same dataset split
as used in the original work [57]. We also train the
same vanilla ranking model using the same triplet rank-
ing loss function with Euclidean distance, except that the
GoogLeNet [73] is replaced with ResNet-18 [25]. The
ResNet-18 achieves better retrieval performance.
Attack and defense results on SOP are present in Tab. 4.
ε
CA+ CA- QA+ QA-
w = 1 2 5 10 w = 1 2 5 10 m = 1 2 5 10 m = 1 2 5 10
(ET) Euclidean Distance, Triplet Loss (R@1=63.1%)
0 50 50 50 50 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 0.0 0.8 2.0 2.6 99.7 99.6 99.4 99.3 4.8 7.0 16.3 25.8 54.9 40.2 27.1 21.9
0.03 0.0 0.3 1.0 1.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.6 3.3 10.0 19.2 68.1 52.4 36.6 30.1
0.06 0.0 0.2 1.0 1.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.1 2.7 8.8 17.6 73.8 57.9 40.3 32.4
(ETD) Euclidean Distance, Triplet Loss, Defensive (R@1=46.4%)
0 50 50 50 50 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 7.5 12.2 16.5 18.0 66.4 62.6 59.3 57.8 16.1 24.8 36.1 41.4 26.7 18.1 12.2 10.2
0.03 0.7 4.5 8.7 10.4 91.7 90.2 89.1 88.4 7.9 14.5 27.2 35.6 43.4 31.7 21.9 18.1
0.06 0.1 3.8 7.9 9.7 97.3 96.8 96.4 96.2 6.9 12.5 24.3 33.4 51.4 39.0 28.0 23.5
Table 4. Adversarial ranking attack and defense on
SOP. With different ε, the worst ranks of CSP in QA+
are 0.2%, 0.7%, 2.0%, 3.3%, and those for QA- are
0.4%, 0.7%, 0.8%, 1.0%, respectively.
It is noted that our attacks are quite effective on this difficult
large-scale dataset, as merely 1% perturbation (ε = 0.01) to
any candidate image could make it ranked ahead or behind
of nearly all the rest candidates (as shown by the CA+ and
CA- results with w = 1). The QA on this dataset is sig-
nificantly effective as well. On the other hand, our defense
method leads to decreased retrieval performance, i.e. R@1
from 63.1% to 46.4%, which is expected on such a difficult
dataset. Meanwhile, our defense could moderately improve
the model robustness against relatively weaker adversarial
examples (e.g. ε = 0.01), but improving model robustness
on this dataset is more difficult, compared to experiments
on other datasets.
By comparing the results among all the three datasets,
we find ranking models trained on harder datasets more sus-
ceptible to adversarial attack, and more difficult to defend.
Therefore, we speculate that models used in realistic appli-
cations could be easier to attack, because they are usually
trained on larger-scale and more difficult datasets.
5. Discussions
In this section, we study the transferability of our adver-
sarial ranking examples, and universal adversarial perturba-
tion for ranking. Both of them illustrate the possibility of
practical black-box attack. Additionally, we also perform
parameter search on the balancing parameter ξ for QA.
5.1. Adversarial Example Transferability
As demonstrated in previous experiments, deep ranking
models can be compromised by our white-box attacks. In
realistic scenarios, the white-box attacks are not practical
enough because the model to be attacked is often unknown
(i.e., the architecture and parameters are unknown).
On the other hand, adversarial examples for classifi-
cation have been found transferable [60, 59] (i.e. model-
agnostic) between different models with different network
architectures. And the transferability has become the foun-
dation of a class of existing black-box attacks. Specifically,
for such a typical attack, adversarial examples are generated
from a replacement model [60] using a white-box attack,
CA+ Transfer (Black Box), w = 1
From
To
LeNet C2F1 Res18
LeNet 50→16.6 35.1 34.3
C2F1 28.6 50→2.1 31.3
Res18 24.4 27.0 50→2.2
CA- Transfer (Black Box), w = 1
From
To
LeNet C2F1 Res18
LeNet 2.5→63.7 2.1→10.0 2.1→9.1
C2F1 2.5→9.1 2.1→93.9 2.1→9.3
Res18 2.5→9.9 2.1→11.8 2.1→66.7
QA+ Transfer (Black Box), m = 1
From
To
LeNet C2F1 Res18
LeNet 50→20.5 43.0 45.8
C2F1 43.5 50→6.3 45.4
Res18 41.4 40.4 50→14.1
QA- Transfer (Black Box), m = 1
From
To
LeNet C2F1 Res18
LeNet 0.5→7.0 0.5→1.6 0.5→1.8
C2F1 0.5→1.0 0.5→8.6 0.5→1.9
Res18 0.5→0.8 0.5→1.2 0.5→6.9
Table 5. Transferability of adversarial ranking examples. Adver-
sarial examples are generated from one model and directly used
on another. We report the rank of the same c with respect to the
same q across different models to illustrate the transfer attack ef-
fectiveness. Transferring adversarial examples to a model itself
(the diagonal lines) is equivalent to white-box attack.
and are directly used to attack the black-box model.
Adversarial ranking attack could be more practical if the
adversarial ranking examples have the similar transferabil-
ity. Besides the C2F1 model, we train two vanilla models on
the MNIST dataset: (1) LeNet [38], which has lower model
capacity compared to C2F1; (2) ResNet-18 [25] (denoted as
Res18), which has a better network architecture and higher
model capacity.
The results are present in Tab. 5. For example, in the
CA+ transfer attack, we generate adversarial candidates
from the C2F1 model and directly use them to attack the
Res18 model (row 2, column 3, top-left table), and the ranks
of the adversarial candidates with respect to the same query
is still raised to 31.3%. We also find the CA- transfer attack
is effective, where the ranks of our adversarial candidates
are lowered, e.g. from 2.1% to 9.3% (row 2, column 3,
bottom-left table). Similar results can be observed on the
QA transfer experiments, and they show weaker effect due
to the SP term.
From the results, we find that: (1) CNN with better ar-
chitecture and higher model capacity (i.e., Res18) is less
susceptible to adversarial ranking attack. This conclusion
is consistent with Madry’s [50], which claims that higher
model capacity could help improve model robustness; (2)
adversarial examples generated from the Res18 have the
most significant effectiveness in transfer attack; (3) CNN
of low model capacity (i.e., LeNet), performs moderately in
terms of both adversarial example transferability and model
robustness. We speculate its robustness stems from a forced
regularization effect due low model capacity. Beyond these,
adversarial ranking examples are transferable disregarding
the difference in loss function or distance metric.
Apart from transferability across different architectures,
we also investigated the transferability between the C2F1
models with different network parameters. Results sug-
gest similar transferability between these models. Notably,
when transferring adversarial examples to a defensive C2F1
model, the attacking effect is significantly mitigated. The
CA+ CA- QA+ QA-
50→ 2.1 2.1→ 93.9 50→ 0.2 0.5→ 94.1
I-CA+ I-CA- I-QA+ I-QA-
50→ 18.1 0.6→ 9.5 50→ 20.5 2.1→ 7.6
I-CA+ (unseen) I-CA- (unseen) I-QA+ (unseen) I-QA- (unseen)
50→ 18.5 0.7→ 9.4 50→ 21.0 2.2→ 7.4
Table 6. Universal Adversarial Perturbation for Ranking on
MNIST. Each pair of results presents the original rank of chosen
candidates and that after adding adversarial perturbation. Both w,
m are set to 1. Parameter ξ is set to 0 to reduce attack difficulty.
result further demonstrates the effectiveness of our defense.
5.2. Universal Perturbation for Ranking
Recently, universal (i.e. image-agnostic) adversarial per-
turbation [53] for classification has been found possible,
where a single perturbation may lead to misclassification
when added to any image. Thus, we also investigate the
existence of universal adversarial perturbation for ranking.
To this end, we follow [53] and formulate the image-
agnostic CA+ (abbr. I-CA+). Given a set of candi-
dates C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} and a set of queries Q =
{q1, q2, . . . , qw}, I-CA+ is to find a single universal adver-
sarial perturbation r, so that the rank of every perturbed can-
didate c˜ = c + r (c ∈ C) with respect to Q can be raised.
The corresponding optimization problem of I-CA+ is:
r = arg min
r∈Γ
∑
c∈C
LCA+(c+ r,Q;X). (14)
When applied with such universal perturbation, the rank of
any candidate w.r.t Q is expected to be raised. The objec-
tive functions of I-CA-, I-QA+ and I-QA- can be obtained
in similar way. Note, unlike [40] which aims to find univer-
sal perturbation that can make image retrieval system return
irrelevant results, our universal perturbations have distinct
purposes.
We conduct experiment on the MNIST dataset. For I-
CA+ attack, we randomly sample 5% of X for generating
the universal perturbation. Following [53], another non-
overlapping 5% examples are randomly sampled from X to
test whether the generated perturbation is generalizable on
“unseen” (i.e., not used for generating the perturbation) im-
ages. Experiments for the other image-agnostic attacks are
conducted similarly. Note, we only report the I-CA- and
I-QA- effectiveness on the 1% top ranked samples, similar
to CA- and QA-.
As shown in Tab. 13, our I-CA can raise the ranks of C
to 18.1%, or lower them to 9.5%. When added to “unseen“
candidate images, our universal perturbation could retain
nearly the same effectiveness. This may due to low intra-
class variance of the MNIST dataset.
ξ
QA+ QA-
m=1 2 5 10 m=1 2 5 10
(CT) Cosine distance, Triplet loss
0 0.2, 33.6 6.3, 23.7 18.5, 26.5 29.6, 25.7 94.1, 89.4 93.2, 90.3 92.6, 90.9 92.3, 91.2
100 6.3, 3.6 11.2, 5.7 22.5, 7.7 32.1, 7.7 55.5, 35.6 52.4, 37.6 50.2, 39.3 49.4, 40.0
102 14.1, 0.6 20.8, 0.7 31.2, 0.7 38.1, 0.7 8.6, 1.6 6.6, 1.6 5.3, 1.5 4.8, 1.5
104 37.9, 0.1 42.6, 0.1 46.3, 0.1 47.8, 0.1 1.9, 0.1 1.4, 0.1 1.2, 0.1 1.1, 0.1
Table 7. Parameter search on Semantics-Preserving balancing pa-
rameter ξ with MNIST. We report two mean ranks in each cell:
one for the chosen candidates C; another for CSP used for SP.
5.3. Semantics Preserving for QA
As discussed previously, the Query Attack (QA) may
drastically change the semantics of the query q. To alleviate
this problem, the Semantics-Preserving (SP) term is added
to the naive QA to help preserve the query semantics. Pre-
dictably, it is more difficult to perform QA with a large ξ,
as the ranks of CSP are almost not allowed to be changed.
To investigate the actual influence of the balancing pa-
rameter ξ, we provide parameter search on it with MNIST
dataset. In particular, We set ξ to 0, 100, 102, 104, and com-
pare their results. Note that when ξ = 0, the QA becomes
naive QA as the SP term is eliminated. With a strong SP
constant, e.g. ξ = 104, the semantics of the chosen query is
almost not allowed to be changed, hence result in extreme
difficulty of attack.
As shown in Tab. 7, setting ξ to 0 could greatly boost
the attacking effect, but consequently the ranks of CSP will
be drastically changed. In contrast, when ξ is set to the
excessive value 104 for a perfectly stealth QA, the attack
can still raise the rank of chosen candidate from 50% to
37.9% in QA+ with m = 1, or lower the rank of chosen
candidate from 0.5% to 1.9% in QA- with m = 1. During
these attacks, the ranks of CSP are kept within 0.1 despite
of the extreme difficulty. It means the query semantics can
be preserved. In practice, we empirically set the parameter
ξ as 1 for QA+, or as 102 for QA- for the balance between
attack effectiveness and preserving query semantics.
6. Conclusion
Deep ranking models are vulnerable to adversarial per-
turbations that could intentionally change the ranking re-
sult. In this paper, we define and implement adversarial
ranking attack that can compromise deep ranking models.
We also propose an adversarial ranking defense that can
significantly suppress embedding shift distance and moder-
ately improve the ranking model robustness. Moreover, the
transferability of our adversarial examples and the existence
of universal adversarial perturbations for ranking attack il-
lustrate the possibility of practical black-box attack and po-
tential risk of realistic ranking applications. In the potential
of future work, we may explore better ranking loss func-
tions, defenses, and black-box attacks.
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A. Adversarial Example Visualization
Some adversarial ranking examples are presented in this
section. Every figure contains three rows of pictures. The
first row shows c, r, c˜ = c + r for CA, or q, r, q˜ = q + r
for QA. The second row shows the query and the original
retrieval results, as well as the chosen candidate c and its
immediately adjacent candidates. The third row shows the
effects of the attack on the ranking list, i.e., either the cho-
sen candidate c is replaced with c˜ for CA, or the query q is
replaced with q˜ for QA. The digits above every picture is
the value of RankX(q, ·)− 1 4.
Pictures with a “ F ” mark on the top-left corner are
adversarial examples. The “←” indicates the chosen can-
didate whose rank will be raised. The “→” indicates the
chosen candidate whose rank will be lowered.
Full visualization results including those on SOP can
be found at https://github.com/cdluminate/
advrank-pub.
A.1. MNIST Dataset
CA+. See Fig. 3,4. CA-. See Fig. 5.
QA+. See Fig. 6. QA-. See Fig. 7.
... ...
...
Figure 3. CA+ on MNIST. Example 1. For query “9”, the candi-
date “7” is ranked at the 2576-th position in the original ranking
list (row 2). After adversarial ranking attack, the rank of the per-
turbed candidate “7” is raised to the 1-st position (row 3). The
original candidate “7”, the learned perturbation r, and the per-
turbed candidate “7” are illustrated in the row 1.
... ...
...
... ...
... ...
Figure 4. CA+ on MNIST. Example 2 & 3.
A.2. Fashion-MNIST
CA+. See Fig. 8. CA-. See Fig. 9.
QA+. See Fig. 10. QA-. See Fig. 11.
4In mathematical context the rank counts from 1, but in implementation
it counts from 0 instead. Hence the offset.
...
... ...
...
... ...
Figure 5. CA- on MNIST. Example 1,2.
... ...
...... ...
... ...
...
Figure 6. QA+ on MNIST. Example 1,2.
...
... ...
...
... ...
Figure 7. QA- on MNIST. Example 1,2.
...
...
... ...
...
...
...
Figure 8. CA+ on Fashion-MNIST. Example 1,2.
...
...
...
...
Figure 9. CA- on Fashion-MNIST. Example 1,2.
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Figure 10. QA+ on Fashion-MNIST. Example 1,2.
...
... ...
...
... ...
Figure 11. QA- on Fashion-MNIST. Example 1,2.
A.3. Semantic-Preserving for QA
Conducting Query Attack without preserving the query
semantics will often lead to irrelevant retrieval results at the
top of the ranking list, as shown in Fig. 12, which raises red
flags and possibly reveals the attack. Therefore, the value
of the Semantics-Preserving term in QA is substantial, as
it keeps the retrieval results as “normal” as possible while
achieving the attacking goal.
...
...
...
Figure 12. QA+ without preserving query semantics.
B. Complete Results of Attack & Defense
Some experiments and details on MNIST, Fashion-
MNIST and SOP datasets are omitted in the manuscript due
to limited space. In this section, we present the complete ex-
perimental results on these datasets, including the average
rank of CSP during QA. Besides, we also conduct attack-
ing experiments on ranking models trained with different
combinations of loss functions and distance metrics. For
brevity, we denote the (Cosine distance, Triplet loss) setting
as (CT), the (Euclidean distance, Contrastive loss) as (EC).
Models trained with our defense method will have a trailing
“D” in notation, e.g. the (CT) model with our defense will
be denoted as (CTD).
See Tab. 9 for complete results on MNIST.
See Tab. 10 for complete results on Fashion-MNIST.
See Tab. 8 for results on SOP.
ε
CA+ CA- SP-QA+ SP-QA-
w = 1 2 5 10 w = 1 2 5 10 m = 1 2 5 10 m = 1 2 5 10
(ET) Euclidean Distance, Triplet Loss (R@1=63.1%)
0 50 50 50 50 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 0.0 0.8 2.0 2.6 99.7 99.6 99.4 99.3 4.8, 0.2 7.0, 0.7 16.3, 1.9 25.8, 2.3 54.9, 0.3 40.2, 0.6 27.1, 0.8 21.9, 0.9
0.03 0.0 0.3 1.0 1.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.6, 0.1 3.3, 0.5 10.0, 2.0 19.2, 2.7 68.1, 0.3 52.4, 0.6 36.6, 0.8 30.1, 1.0
0.06 0.0 0.2 1.0 1.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.1, 0.2 2.7, 0.6 8.8, 1.9 17.6, 3.3 73.8, 0.4 57.9, 0.7 40.3, 0.8 32.4, 1.0
(ETD) Euclidean Distance, Triplet Loss, Defensive (R@1=46.4%)
0 50 50 50 50 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 7.5 12.2 16.5 18.0 66.4 62.6 59.3 57.8 16.1, 2.1 24.8, 2.7 36.1, 2.7 41.4, 2.5 26.7, 0.6 18.1, 0.7 12.2, 0.7 10.2, 0.7
0.03 0.7 4.5 8.7 10.4 91.7 90.2 89.1 88.4 7.9, 2.9 14.5, 4.2 27.2, 5.4 35.6, 5.3 43.4, 1.3 31.7, 1.5 21.9, 1.7 18.1, 1.8
0.06 0.1 3.8 7.9 9.7 97.3 96.8 96.4 96.2 6.9, 4.3 12.5, 5.8 24.3, 7.0 33.4, 6.9 51.4, 2.8 39.0, 3.2 28.0, 3.5 23.5, 3.6
Table 8. Experiments on SOP dataset.
ε
CA+ CA- SP-QA+ SP-QA-
w = 1 2 5 10 w = 1 2 5 10 m = 1 2 5 10 m = 1 2 5 10
(CC) Cosine Distance, Contrastive Loss (R@1=98.6%)
0 50 50 50 50 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 42.2 43.3 44.6 44.7 5.6 5.3 5.2 5.1 45.0, 0.5 46.9, 0.5 48.4, 0.5 49.1, 0.5 1.2, 0.5 1.2, 0.5 1.1, 0.5 1.1, 0.5
0.03 31.3 33.5 35.4 36.1 9.3 9.2 9.1 9.1 37.6, 2.3 41.7, 2.5 45.9, 2.5 47.7, 2.5 2.8, 1.8 2.7, 1.8 2.7, 1.8 2.6, 1.8
0.1 9.7 12.5 14.6 15.6 52.1 52.2 52.4 52.5 18.5, 8.2 27.1, 9.7 38.0, 9.9 43.4, 9.9 5.6, 4.1 5.4, 4.1 5.4, 4.1 5.4, 4.1
0.3 5.8 10.0 11.9 12.9 99.0 99.1 99.0 99.1 14.3, 9.7 23.3, 12.5 36.3, 13.8 42.6, 13.9 6.1, 4.4 5.8, 4.4 5.7, 4.4 5.7, 4.4
(CT) Cosine Distance, Triplet Loss (R@1=99.1%)
0 50 50 50 50 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 44.6 45.4 47.4 47.9 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.1 45.2, 0.0 46.3, 0.0 47.7, 0.0 48.5, 0.0 0.9, 0.0 0.7, 0.0 0.6, 0.0 0.6, 0.1
0.03 33.4 37.3 41.9 43.9 6.3 5.9 5.7 5.6 35.6, 0.3 39.2, 0.3 43.4, 0.3 45.8, 0.3 1.9, 0.2 1.4, 0.2 1.1, 0.2 1.1, 0.2
0.1 12.7 17.4 24.4 30.0 15.4 14.9 14.8 14.7 14.4, 2.2 21.0, 2.3 30.6, 2.3 37.2, 2.3 5.6, 1.2 4.4, 1.2 3.7, 1.2 3.5, 1.2
0.3 2.1 9.1 13.0 17.9 93.9 93.2 93.0 92.9 6.3, 3.6 11.2, 5.7 22.5, 7.7 32.1, 7.7 8.6, 1.6 6.6, 1.6 5.3, 1.5 4.8, 1.5
(EC) Euclidean Distance, Contrastive Loss (R@1=99.0%)
0 50 50 50 50 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 31.9 33.5 34.6 34.9 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.8 41.3, 2.0 44.0, 2.2 47.2, 2.4 48.4, 2.5 2.6, 1.3 2.4, 1.3 2.2, 1.3 2.2, 1.3
0.03 15.8 17.4 18.7 19.1 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.5 27.2, 4.8 34.6, 5.4 42.0, 5.6 45.6, 5.8 4.1, 2.5 3.9, 2.5 3.7, 2.5 3.7, 2.5
0.1 6.7 10.0 12.1 12.7 82.1 81.6 81.7 82.0 15.7, 9.8 25.4, 12.0 37.7, 13.1 43.2, 13.1 5.6, 3.2 5.3, 3.2 4.9, 3.2 4.9, 3.2
0.3 4.8 9.9 12.1 12.7 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.8 14.4, 9.4 23.9, 12.5 36.7, 13.6 42.6, 13.8 5.9, 3.2 5.4, 3.2 5.0, 3.2 4.9, 3.1
(ET) Euclidean Distance, Triplet Loss (R@1=99.2%)
0 50 50 50 50 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 39.0 40.4 40.6 40.8 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.8 45.5, 0.1 47.4, 0.1 48.1, 0.1 49.0, 0.1 1.0, 0.1 0.9, 0.1 0.8, 0.1 0.8, 0.1
0.03 23.5 25.6 26.5 27.0 7.0 6.6 6.3 6.2 36.4, 0.6 40.9, 0.7 45.1, 0.8 47.1, 0.9 2.7, 0.7 2.3, 0.7 2.0, 0.7 2.0, 0.8
0.1 8.1 10.6 12.1 12.7 13.7 13.3 13.0 12.9 14.1, 4.8 23.4, 5.7 34.6, 6.2 40.8, 6.5 6.2, 1.7 5.1, 1.7 4.4, 1.7 4.2, 1.7
0.3 1.8 8.5 10.9 11.7 77.4 75.7 75.0 74.7 7.5, 5.2 15.0, 7.4 28.1, 9.0 36.3, 8.9 7.4, 1.7 5.8, 1.7 4.9, 1.7 4.6, 1.7
(CCD) Cosine Distance, Contrastive Loss, Defensive (R@1=97.5%)
0 50 50 50 50 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 49.3 49.0 49.3 49.3 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 49.7, 0.0 49.6, 0.0 49.8, 0.0 49.9, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0
0.03 47.0 47.9 48.1 48.0 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 48.3, 0.0 49.1, 0.0 49.1, 0.0 49.4, 0.0 0.6, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0
0.1 42.3 43.3 44.0 44.4 4.2 4.0 3.9 3.8 44.9 ,0.1 46.7 ,0.1 48.1 ,0.1 48.8 ,0.1 0.8 ,0.1 0.7 ,0.1 0.7 ,0.1 0.7 ,0.1
0.3 32.0 34.2 36.1 36.7 7.0 7.0 6.5 6.4 37.4, 0.6 41.1, 0.6 44.9, 0.5 47.2, 0.5 1.9, 0.5 1.6, 0.5 1.5, 0.5 1.5, 0.5
(CTD) Cosine Distance, Triplet Loss, Defensive (R@1=98.3%)
0 50 50 50 50 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 48.9 49.3 49.4 49.5 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 49.9, 0.0 49.5, 0.0 49.5, 0.0 49.7, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0
0.03 47.4 48.4 48.6 48.9 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 48.0, 0.0 48.5, 0.0 49.2, 0.0 49.5, 0.0 0.6, 0.0 0.6, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0
0.1 42.4 44.2 45.9 46.7 3.8 3.6 3.5 3.4 43.2, 0.1 45.0, 0.1 47.4, 0.1 48.2, 0.1 1.0, 0.1 0.8, 0.1 0.7, 0.1 0.7, 0.1
0.3 30.7 34.5 38.7 40.7 7.0 6.7 6.5 6.5 33.2, 0.5 37.2, 0.5 42.3, 0.5 45.1, 0.5 2.4, 0.4 1.9, 0.4 1.6, 0.4 1.5, 0.4
(ECD) Euclidean Distance, Contrastive Loss, Defensive (R@1=97.9%)
0 50 50 50 50 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 47.4 47.6 48.0 47.8 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 48.7, 0.1 49.1, 0.1 49.4, 0.1 49.7, 0.1 0.9, 0.1 0.8, 0.1 0.7, 0.1 0.7, 0.1
0.03 42.7 43.6 44.0 44.2 4.5 4.2 4.0 4.0 46.3, 0.6 48.1, 0.6 48.8, 0.6 49.2, 0.6 1.8, 0.6 1.6, 0.6 1.5, 0.6 1.4, 0.6
0.1 31.7 33.7 34.9 35.3 10.0 9.6 9.4 9.3 39.2, 2.8 43.2, 2.9 46.6, 2.9 47.9, 2.9 3.3, 1.3 2.9, 1.3 2.7, 1.3 2.6, 1.3
0.3 19.6 23.0 25.4 26.3 35.6 35.2 35.7 36.0 27.3, 7.1 34.4, 7.4 42.2, 7.1 45.4, 6.9 4.5, 1.8 3.9, 1.8 3.6, 1.8 3.4, 1.8
(ETD) Euclidean Distance, Triplet Loss, Defensive (R@1=99.0%)
0 50 50 50 50 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 47.5 48.2 48.1 48.2 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 48.5, 0.0 48.8, 0.0 49.4, 0.0 49.7, 0.0 0.6, 0.0 0.6, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0
0.03 43.4 43.8 44.1 44.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 46.6, 0.0 47.8, 0.0 48.9, 0.1 49.3, 0.1 0.8, 0.1 0.7, 0.1 0.6, 0.1 0.6, 0.1
0.1 29.8 31.3 32.6 33.0 5.7 5.2 5.0 4.9 39.6, 0.3 42.9, 0.3 45.9, 0.4 47.9, 0.4 2.1, 0.4 1.7, 0.4 1.5, 0.4 1.4, 0.4
0.3 10.8 13.2 15.0 15.6 14.4 13.9 13.5 13.4 19.7, 3.2 28.1, 3.7 37.4, 4.1 42.6, 4.3 6.5, 1.7 5.3, 1.7 4.7, 1.8 4.5 1.8
Table 9. Complete Experiment Results on MNIST. The first value
for each QA (i.e. SP-QA) experiment result is the average rank of
the chosen candidates, while the other value is the average rank of
the CSP used for SP.
ε
CA+ CA- SP-QA+ SP-QA-
w = 1 2 5 10 w = 1 2 5 10 m = 1 2 5 10 m = 1 2 5 10
(CC) Cosine Distance, Contrastive Loss (R@1=88.7%)
0 50 50 50 50 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 29.8 32.8 34.2 34.7 9.8 9.3 9.0 8.8 36.1, 1.6 40.3, 1.6 44.8, 1.5 46.9, 1.5 3.1, 1.4 2.8, 1.4 2.5, 1.4 2.5, 1.4
0.03 12.5 16.4 19.1 20.3 46.0 45.2 44.7 44.5 18.5, 4.6 25.7, 5.6 35.6, 5.9 41.6, 5.9 4.9, 2.4 4.4, 2.4 4.0, 2.4 3.9, 2.5
0.1 4.8 10.1 13.4 14.9 96.0 96.0 96.0 96.0 10.3, 7.0 17.3, 9.7 30.0, 11.1 38.2, 11.7 7.1, 3.7 6.4, 3.7 5.9, 3.7 5.7, 3.7
0.3 3.7 9.6 12.8 14.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 9.0, 6.3 15.7, 9.3 28.5, 11.3 37.5, 11.6 7.2, 3.5 6.4, 3.5 5.8, 3.5 5.6, 3.4
(CT) Cosine Distance, Triplet Loss (R@1=88.8%)
0 50 50 50 50 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 36.6 39.9 43.2 44.8 5.6 5.1 4.9 4.8 39.4, 0.2 42.0, 0.2 45.3, 0.2 47.1, 0.2 2.1, 0.2 1.6, 0.2 1.2, 0.2 1.1, 0.2
0.03 19.7 25.4 31.7 35.6 15.5 14.8 14.4 14.3 21.7, 1.5 28.2, 1.6 35.7, 1.7 40.6, 1.7 5.6, 0.8 4.1, 0.8 3.3, 0.8 2.9, 0.7
0.1 3.7 10.5 17.3 22.7 87.2 86.7 86.3 86.3 7.1, 2.4 12.4, 4.5 23.6, 6.9 32.5, 6.8 10.9, 1.9 8.3, 1.9 6.7, 1.9 6.0, 1.8
0.3 1.3 9.4 16.0 21.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 6.3, 3.0 10.8, 5.2 21.8, 7.8 31.7, 8.3 12.6, 1.9 9.4, 1.9 7.5, 1.9 6.6, 1.8
(EC) Euclidean Distance, Contrastive Loss (R@1=87.6%)
0 50 50 50 50 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 20.9 23.6 25.7 26.4 12.3 11.7 11.3 11.1 30.6, 3.7 36.7, 3.8 42.8, 3.9 45.8, 3.8 3.8, 1.6 3.3, 1.6 3.0, 1.6 2.9, 1.6
0.03 7.0 11.5 14.8 16.0 74.1 72.9 71.8 71.4 15.7, 8.0 25.4, 9.3 36.9, 9.1 42.4, 8.8 4.6, 2.0 4.0, 2.0 3.6, 2.0 3.6, 2.1
0.1 6.2 12.2 17.0 18.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 14.2, 9.3 22.6, 12.3 34.8, 13.2 41.2, 13.0 8.3, 4.7 7.8, 4.8 7.3, 4.8 7.1, 4.8
0.3 5.7 12.0 16.5 18.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 12.8, 9.0 21.1, 11.9 33.8, 13.5 40.4, 13.4 9.1, 5.1 8.4, 5.2 7.9, 5.0 7.5, 4.9
(ET) Euclidean Distance, Triplet Loss (R@1=88.3%)
0 50 50 50 50 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 33.2 34.8 34.7 36.1 6.5 5.9 5.5 5.3 41.7, 0.3 44.4, 0.3 47.3, 0.3 48.4, 0.3 2.5, 0.3 1.9, 0.3 1.6, 0.3 1.4, 0.3
0.03 14.0 17.6 20.3 21.3 18.4 17.2 16.4 16.0 22.2, 2.5 30.0, 2.7 39.4, 2.7 43.6, 2.6 6.6, 1.3 5.1, 1.4 4.2, 1.4 3.9, 1.4
0.1 1.7 9.5 14.0 15.6 88.3 86.7 85.2 84.5 8.0, 3.9 15.0, 6.3 27.6, 7.9 36.5, 8.1 10.5, 1.9 8.0, 1.9 6.4, 2.0 6.0, 2.0
0.3 0.3 9.0 13.8 15.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 6.7, 3.3 12.6, 5.7 25.4, 7.9 34.8, 8.3 11.9, 1.9 8.9, 1.9 7.1, 1.9 6.4, 1.9
(CCD) Cosine Distance, Contrastive Loss, Defensive (R@1=82.2%)
0 50 50 50 50 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 47.0 47.7 47.8 47.9 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 48.9, 0.0 48.7, 0.0 49.2, 0.0 49.6, 0.0 0.6, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0
0.03 42.2 43.3 44.1 44.3 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.8 45.2, 0.0 47.2, 0.0 48.0, 0.0 49.1, 0.0 0.8, 0.0 0.7, 0.0 0.6, 0.0 0.6, 0.0
0.1 29.1 31.4 32.9 33.8 8.0 7.1 6.4 6.2 34.7, 0.1 39.5, 0.1 43.8, 0.1 46.5, 0.1 3.3, 0.1 2.1, 0.1 1.5, 0.1 1.3, 0.1
0.3 11.8 14.8 17.4 18.4 28.7 25.5 23.1 22.4 13.3, 0.7 20.0, 0.9 31.0, 1.0 38.3, 1.0 21.3, 1.0 14.3, 1.0 10.3, 1.0 8.6, 1.1
(CTD) Cosine Distance, Triplet Loss, Defensive (R@1=79.6%)
0 50 50 50 50 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 48.9 48.9 49.3 49.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 49.4, 0.0 49.9, 0.0 49.9, 0.0 50.0, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0
0.03 47.1 47.9 48.3 48.3 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 48.3, 0.0 49.1, 0.0 49.5, 0.0 49.8, 0.0 0.7, 0.0 0.6, 0.0 0.6, 0.0 0.6, 0.0
0.1 42.4 43.5 44.5 44.8 4.6 4.2 4.0 3.9 45.4, 0.3 47.2, 0.2 48.7, 0.2 49.2, 0.2 1.4, 0.2 1.2, 0.2 1.1, 0.2 1.0, 0.2
0.3 32.5 35.4 37.5 38.2 11.2 10.5 10.1 10.0 39.3, 1.5 42.6, 1.5 46.5, 1.3 47.8, 1.3 3.9, 1.4 3.3, 1.4 3.0, 1.4 2.9, 1.4
(ECD) Euclidean Distance, Contrastive Loss, Defensive (R@1=80.4%)
0 50 50 50 50 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 45.3 45.8 46.3 46.6 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.6 48.0, 0.2 48.7, 0.2 49.3, 0.3 49.7, 0.3 1.2, 0.2 1.0, 0.2 0.9, 0.2 0.9, 0.2
0.03 37.6 39.5 40.4 40.7 7.5 7.0 6.8 6.7 43.9, 1.5 46.4, 1.6 48.4, 1.7 49.1, 1.9 2.7, 0.7 2.2, 0.7 1.9, 0.7 1.9, 0.7
0.1 20.3 24.9 27.8 28.6 32.6 32.1 32.0 32.5 28.4, 6.6 36.2, 7.2 43.0, 7.4 45.9, 7.4 5.3, 1.5 4.4, 1.6 3.8, 1.6 3.7, 1.6
0.3 7.3 16.0 21.1 22.5 78.0 79.0 80.3 81.2 14.0, 10.2 24.6, 11.9 36.5, 11.8 42.2, 11.2 7.0, 1.9 5.7, 1.9 4.9, 1.9 4.6, 1.9
(ETD) Euclidean Distance, Triplet Loss, Defensive (R@1=84.4%)
0 50 50 50 50 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 46.0 46.7 46.9 46.7 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 48.1, 0.0 49.1, 0.0 49.3, 0.0 49.6, 0.0 0.8, 0.0 0.7, 0.0 0.6, 0.0 0.6, 0.1
0.03 38.9 40.6 41.2 41.4 4.3 3.8 3.5 3.4 45.2, 0.2 46.2, 0.1 48.1, 0.1 48.9, 0.1 1.9, 0.2 1.5, 0.2 1.2, 0.2 1.1, 0.2
0.1 23.0 26.3 28.0 28.8 15.9 14.9 14.2 13.9 31.8, 1.8 38.0, 1.8 43.3, 1.6 46.2, 1.6 5.6, 1.0 4.3, 1.0 3.6, 1.0 3.3, 1.0
0.3 7.1 13.9 18.4 19.9 54.1 51.8 50.0 49.2 10.6, 5.6 19.7, 7.1 32.5, 8.0 39.6, 7.6 9.2, 1.6 7.0, 1.6 5.6, 1.6 5.1, 1.6
Table 10. Complete Experiments on Fashion-MNIST Dataset.
Each QA result comprises the average rank of the chosen candi-
dates and the CSP used for SP, respectively.
C. Complete Results on Transferability
C.1. Fashion-MNIST
In addition to the transferability experiment on MNIST
dataset, we also conduct the same transferability experiment
on the Fashion-MNIST dataset, as shown in Tab. 11.
C.2. “Self-Transfer” Attack on MNIST
In the adversarial ranking example transferability ex-
periments, we transfer adversarial examples between neu-
ral networks with different architectures. In this section,
we transfer adversarial examples between neural networks
based on the same architecture but with different parame-
ters.
We train three vanilla C2F1 models (denoted as C2F1-
1, C2F1-2, and C2f1-3) on MNIST dataset and two mod-
els with our defense (denoted as C2F1-D1, C2F1-D2). All
these models have exactly the same architecture, but dif-
ferent parameters. Transferability experimental results be-
tween these models are present in Tab. 12.
D. Complete Results for Universal Perturba-
tion
D.1. MNIST
See Tab. 13.
CA+ Transfer (Black Box), w = 1
From
To
LeNet C2F1 Res18
LeNet 50→16.0 41.0 44.3
C2F1 38.6 50→1.3 40.3
Res18 39.2 34.3 50→1.7
CA- Transfer (Black Box), w = 1
From
To
LeNet C2F1 Res18
LeNet 2.5→84.3 1.9→8.1 1.6→6.0
C2F1 2.5→7.8 1.9→100.0 1.7→7.7
Res18 2.5→9.5 1.9→14.4 1.7→80.0
SP-QA+ Transfer (Black Box), m = 1
From
To
LeNet C2F1 Res18
LeNet 50→18.0 47.2 49.3
C2F1 48.1 50→6.4 49.2
Res18 48.1 44.8 50→13.7
SP-QA- Transfer (Black Box), m = 1
From
To
LeNet C2F1 Res18
LeNet 0.5→13.5 0.5→1.7 0.5→1.5
C2F1 0.5→1.1 0.5→12.5 0.5→1.6
Res18 0.5→0.9 0.5→1.3 0.5→8.0
Table 11. Transferability experiment on Fashion-MNIST dataset.
D.2. Fashion-MNIST
As shown in Tab. 14, Image-agnostic adversarial pertur-
bation has better effect on seen data from Fashion-MNIST,
but the gap between the effect on seen samples and that
on unseen samples is slightly larger, which may due to the
higher intra-class variance of Fashion-MNIST than MNIST.
E. Complete Parameter Search on ξ
See Tab. 15.
F. Analysis on Our Defense
Ian et al. [21] proposed a linear explanation of adversar-
ial examples:
Consider the dot product between a weight
vectorw and an adversarial example x˜ = x+
r (‖r‖∞ < ε):
wT x˜ = wTx+ wT r. (15)
The adversarial perturbation causes the acti-
vation to grow by wT r. We can maximize
this increase subject to the max norm con-
straint on r by assigning r = εsign(w). If w
has k dimensions and the average magnitude
CA+ Transfer (Black Box), w = 1
From
To
C2F1-1 C2F1-2 C2F1-3 C2F1-D1 C2F1-D2
C2F1-1 50→2.1 27.9 25.3 45.3 45.1
C2F1-2 24.4 50→2.7 23.7 44.5 44.0
C2F1-3 22.6 24.4 50→2.2 45.0 44.5
C2F1-D1 36.7 37.7 37.4 50→30.9 38.6
C2F1-D2 37.3 36.8 37.3 39.6 50→30.3
CA- Transfer (Black Box), w = 1
From
To
C2F1-1 C2F1-2 C2F1-3 C2F1-D1 C2F1-D2
C2F1-1 2.1→93.7 2.2→9.4 2.1→11.1 2.0→3.2 1.9→3.1
C2F1-2 2.1→13.5 2.1→88.1 2.2→12.3 2.0→3.4 1.9→3.3
C2F1-3 2.1→13.4 2.2→10.1 2.2→92.4 2.0→3.2 1.9→3.2
C2F1-D1 2.1→9.3 2.2→8.3 2.1→9.1 2.0→7.0 2.0→4.9
C2F1-D2 2.1→9.2 2.2→8.4 2.1→9.1 2.0→4.9 1.9→7.0
SP-QA+ Transfer (Black Box), m = 1
From
To
C2F1-1 C2F1-2 C2F1-3 C2F1-D1 C2F1-D2
C2F1-1 50→6.4 39.4 38.1 48.6 48.1
C2F1-2 36.6 50→6.3 36.4 47.3 48.4
C2F1-3 36.9 37.8 50→6.2 48.7 48.3
C2F1-D1 41.5 40.3 41.4 50→32.9 40.6
C2F1-D2 41.7 38.9 41.7 41.4 50→32.7
SP-QA- Transfer (Black Box), m = 1
From
To
C2F1-1 C2F1-2 C2F1-3 C2F1-D1 C2F1-D2
C2F1-1 0.5→8.8 0.5→1.4 0.5→1.9 0.5→0.6 0.5→0.6
C2F1-2 0.5→2.3 0.5→9.0 0.5→2.2 0.5→0.6 0.5→0.6
C2F1-3 0.5→1.9 0.5→1.5 0.5→8.7 0.5→0.6 0.5→0.6
C2F1-D1 0.5→5.8 0.5→3.1 0.5→4.8 0.5→2.4 0.5→1.3
C2F1-D2 0.5→7.1 0.5→3.7 0.5→5.9 0.5→1.3 0.5→2.4
Table 12. Transfer experiment between models based on the same
architecture but with different parameters.
Model I-CA+ (w = 1) I-CA- (w = 1) I-QA+ (m = 1) I-QA- (m = 1)Seen Unseen Seen Unseen Seen Unseen Seen Unseen
(CC) 50→ 13.7 50→ 14.1 0.6→ 37.6 0.6→ 33.4 50→ 18.1 50→ 18.9 2.4→ 41.6 2.4→ 39.3
(CT) 50→ 18.1 50→ 18.5 0.6→ 9.5 0.7→ 9.4 50→ 20.5 50→ 21.0 2.1→ 7.6 2.2→ 7.4
(EC) 50→ 9.1 50→ 10.3 1.9→ 94.6 2.0→ 79.4 50→ 3.9 50→ 6.9 3.3→ 87.1 3.5→ 74.4
(ET) 50→ 11.5 50→ 12.6 2.1→ 10.6 2.1→ 9.6 50→ 21.6 50→ 23.6 3.2→ 28.6 3.2→ 19.5
Table 13. Universal Adversarial Ranking Perturbation on MNIST.
Each pair of result presents the original rank of chosen candi-
date(s), and the rank of the chosen candidate(s) after adding adver-
sarial perturbation to the candidate or to the query. “Seen” sam-
ples are those used for generating the universal perturbation, while
“Unseen” samples are a set of other non-overlapping samples.
Model I-CA+ (w = 1) I-CA- (w = 1) I-QA+ (m = 1) I-QA- (m = 1)Seen Unseen Seen Unseen Seen Unseen Seen Unseen
(CC) 50→ 7.0 50→ 7.3 0.6→ 91.8 0.6→ 84.9 50→ 4.4 50→ 4.9 2.1→ 87.5 2.1→ 84.4
(CT) 50→ 9.8 50→ 9.9 0.6→ 72.3 0.6→ 69.7 50→ 8.2 50→ 8.4 2.0→ 76.3 2.0→ 72.9
(EC) 50→ 5.8 50→ 9.6 2.0→ 97.5 1.9→ 83.7 50→ 1.8 50→ 7.1 2.9→ 87.9 2.8→ 78.4
(ET) 50→ 5.7 50→ 8.5 2.0→ 84.4 1.9→ 69.9 50→ 3.3 50→ 6.3 3.1→ 88.0 3.0→ 78.0
Table 14. Image-agnostic Adversarial Perturbation on Fashion-
MNIST.
of an element of the weight vector is h, then
ξ
SP-QA+ SP-QA-
m=1 2 5 10 m=1 2 5 10
(CC) Cosine, Contrastive
0 1.4, 43.9 13.8, 38.1 30.7, 37.9 39.4, 36.3 94.7, 93.3 94.4, 93.5 94.2, 93.7 94.1, 93.8
100 14.3, 9.7 23.3, 12.5 36.3, 13.8 42.6, 13.9 40.6, 37.6 40.6, 38.1 40.4, 38.1 39.8, 37.7
102 25.4, 2.0 33.2, 2.1 41.7, 2.1 45.4, 2.1 6.1, 4.4 5.8, 4.4 5.7, 4.4 5.7, 4.4
104 48.1, 0.3 49.2, 0.2 49.6, 0.2 49.8, 0.3 1.2, 0.3 1.1, 0.3 1.1, 0.3 1.1, 0.3
(CT) Cosine, Triplet
0 0.2, 33.6 6.3, 23.7 18.5, 26.5 29.6, 25.7 94.1, 89.4 93.2, 90.3 92.6, 90.9 92.3, 91.2
100 6.3, 3.6 11.2, 5.7 22.5, 7.7 32.1, 7.7 55.5, 35.6 52.4, 37.6 50.2, 39.3 49.4, 40.0
102 14.1, 0.6 20.8, 0.7 31.2, 0.7 38.1, 0.7 8.6, 1.6 6.6, 1.6 5.3, 1.5 4.8, 1.5
104 37.9, 0.1 42.6, 0.1 46.3, 0.1 47.8, 0.1 1.9, 0.1 1.4, 0.1 1.2, 0.1 1.1, 0.1
(EC) Euclidean, Contrastive
0 0.7, 44.5 13.4, 39.9 31.0, 41.8 39.7, 41.6 94.0, 92.6 93.9, 93.0 93.9, 93.4 93.9, 93.5
100 14.4, 9.4 23.9, 12.5 36.7, 13.6 42.6, 13.8 39.9, 37.6 39.0, 37.2 39.2, 37.7 38.7, 37.3
102 30.1, 1.2 37.3, 1.1 43.9, 0.9 46.7, 0.9 5.9, 3.2 5.4, 3.2 5.0, 3.2 4.9, 3.1
104 50.1, 0.8 50.2, 0.8 49.8, 0.8 50.0, 0.8 1.6, 0.7 1.6, 0.7 1.7, 0.8 1.6, 0.8
(ET) Euclidean, Triplet
0 0.6, 37.4 8.2, 35.1 22.6, 38.2 33.2, 38.8 93.0, 88.4 92.5, 89.9 92.3, 90.9 92.1, 90.9
100 7.5, 5.2 15.0, 7.4 28.1, 9.0 36.3, 8.9 50.9, 37.3 49.2, 39.4 47.7, 40.6 47.2, 40.9
102 20.3, 0.5 28.6, 0.5 38.2, 0.5 43.1, 0.4 7.4, 1.7 5.8, 1.7 4.9, 1.7 4.6, 1.7
104 46.2, 0.1 48.2, 0.1 49.1, 0.1 49.6, 0.1 1.7, 0.1 1.4, 0.1 1.2, 0.1 1.1, 0.1
Table 15. Parameter search on Semantics-Preserving balancing pa-
rameter ξ with MNIST. We report two mean ranks in each cell: one
for the chosen candidate(s) C, the other for the CSP used for SP.
Figure 13. Weights and bias of the first convolutional layer (conv1)
with/without our defense.
the activation will grow by εkh. Since ‖r‖∞
does not grow with the dimensionality of the
Figure 14. Weights and bias of the second convolutional layer
(conv2) with/without our defense.
Figure 15. Weights and bias of the first fully-connected layer (fc1)
with/without our defense.
problem but the change in activation caused
by perturbation by r can grow linearly with
k, then for high dimensional problems, we
can make many infinitesimal changes to the
input that add up to one large change to the
output.
In our experiments, we analysed the parameters in mod-
els trained on MNIST, as shown in Fig. 13, 14, 15. These
violin plots suggest that
• the weights in the first convolution layer of the defen-
sive model are closer to 0 and have smaller variance
than those of the vanilla model. That means the h in
the above quotation is decreased with our defense, and
it will be harder for the r to incur a large increase in
activation εkh.
• the bias in the first convolution layer of the defen-
sive model tend to be negative values instead of being
nearly “zero-mean”. These negative bias could help
further suppress the increase in activation caused by
purturbation r.
Therefore, Ian et al.’s [21] theory could explain why our de-
fense works, as the resulting differences in network param-
eters may help reduce the probability for adversarial pertur-
bation to increase the layer outputs into the local linear area
of ReLU.
G. Alternative Attack
G.1. Distance-based Ranking Attack
In order to implement the proposed ranking attack, al-
ternative attacking objectives are possible. Some related
works such as Feature Adversary [66] generates untar-
geted adversarial examples against classifiers by maximiz-
ing the distance shift of representation vectors off their orig-
inal locations. This may inspire an alternative version of CA
or QA objective functions which are directly based on dis-
tance. For example, such alternative objective for CA+ and
QA- could be as follows:
r = arg min
r∈Γ
∑
q∈Q
d(q, c+ r) (16)
r = arg max
r∈Γ
∑
c∈C
d(q + r, c). (17)
However, it must be pointed out that our method signifi-
cantly differs from feature adversary [66]: (1) Feature ad-
versary concerns the pairwise similarity of source-target
representations, while our image ranking problem concerns
the ranking order of multiple candidates; (2) Feature adver-
sary attempts to reduce the `2 distance as much as possible,
while our triplet-like loss attempts to make positive candi-
dates closer to query than the negative ones, which well fits
the objective of ranking order optimization. Such relative
distance optimization becomes more important since our at-
tack simultaneously involves multiple queries and multiple
candidates; (3) The `2 distance based methods suffer from
inevitable disadvantages. Specifically, distance-based ob-
jectives are suboptimal, because they disregard the relative
positions among the candidates and queries.
As shown in the top-left part of Fig. 16, the solution set
for for distance-based CA+ (the green dotted line) contains
suboptimal solutions. Similarly, in the bottom-left part of
Fig. 16 the distance-based objective for QA- tends to maxi-
mize the sum of distance neglecting the ranking result, and
further optimization (moving q˜ along the green arrow) will
not change the ranking result. In contrast, our proposed
inequality-based method does not suffer from these issues,
as shown in the top-right and bottom-right parts.
We also implemented such distance-based method and
compared it with our triplet-like method, as shown in
Tab. 16. Experimental results suggest that our method al-
ways outperforms distance-based method by a margin. Es-
pecially for QA-, the distance-based objective is very dif-
ficult to optimize because the distance-based Semantics-
Preserving term contradicts with the other term in the loss
function. In summary, distance-based method is not well-
suited for our proposed adversarial ranking attack, espe-
cially in the scenario of QA-.
c₄
c₂
c₁
c₃
q₁
q₂
c₁
c₂
Distance objective (CA+) 
Query: q₁ → 
Query: q₂ → 
q₁
q₂
c₁
Ours: Inequality objective (CA+)
c₂
Query: q₁ →
Query: q₂ →
c₄
c₂
c₁
c₃
Distance objective (QA-) 
Query:     → c₁ c₂ c₄ c₃ 
Inequality objective (QA-)
Query:     → c₃,c₄,c₁,c₂
Figure 16. Distance-based CA+ (top-left) and QA- (bottom-left)
objective functions do not lead to desired attacking result com-
pared to our inequality-based method (top-right and bottom-right).
In the top-left diagram for CA+, q1 and q2 are the chosen queries,
while c˜ is the adversarial candidate found by the distance objec-
tive. In the bottom-left diagram of QA-, c1 and c2 are the chosen
candidates, while q˜ is the adversarial query found by the distance
objective. It is noted that the distance objective is not optimal as
shown in the top-left part, where the solution set for minimizing
the distance objective contains suboptimal results. Distance-based
objective may even fail to change the ranking result as shown in
the bottom-left part, where optimizing the objective further cannot
change the ranking result. In contrast, our proposed inequality-
based method does not suffer from these issues, as shown in the
top-right and bottom-right parts.
ε
CA+ CA- QA+ QA-
w = 1 2 5 10 w = 1 2 5 10 m = 1 2 5 10 m = 1 2 5 10
0.3 3.0 9.5 15.9 22.2 86.0 85.2 84.7 84.6 7.4 20.2 34.9 41.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Table 16. Attack Based on L-2 Distance Loss with MNIST.
H. Alternative Defense
Apart from the defense provided in the manuscript, we
also tried some other loss functions for adversarial training.
In literature, there is no predominant choice for the adver-
sarial training loss function. The only common trait among
these choices is that all of them involve adversarial exam-
ples. Inspired by previous works, we also implement some
alternative defenses for ranking systems as follows.
H.1. Straightforward Adaptation of Madry Defense
Madry [50] formularised improving neural network clas-
sifier robustness as a min-max optimization problem, where
the inner maximization seeks to generate adversarial exam-
ples that lead to maximum cross-entropy loss LCE, while
the outer minimization tunes the neural network parameters
θ to suppress the cross-entropy loss:
min
θ
{
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
r∈Γ
LCE(x+ r, y)
]}
(18)
where (x, y) is a pair of image and ground-truth class label.
ε
CA+ CA- QA+ QA-
w = 1 2 5 10 w = 1 2 5 10 m = 1 2 5 10 m = 1 2 5 10
(CCD) Cosine Distance, Contrastive Loss, Defensive (R@1=95.3%)
0 50 50 50 50 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 49.1 49.3 49.6 49.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 49.7, 0.0 49.9, 0.0 50.0, 0.0 49.8, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0
0.03 48.0 48.2 48.5 48.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 48.7, 0.0 49.2, 0.0 49.7, 0.0 49.7, 0.0 0.6, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0
0.1 43.1 44.4 45.2 45.5 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 45.3, 0.1 47.4, 0.1 48.6, 0.1 49.4, 0.1 0.8, 0.1 0.7, 0.1 0.6, 0.1 0.6, 0.1
0.3 33.3 35.8 37.4 38.0 5.6 5.1 4.8 4.7 38.2, 0.3 42.3, 0.3 45.7, 0.3 47.6, 0.3 2.1, 0.4 1.7, 0.4 1.5, 0.4 1.5, 0.4
(CTD) Cosine Distance, Triplet Loss, Defensive (R@1=97.4%)
0 50 50 50 50 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 50 50 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01 49.3 49.6 49.5 49.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 49.5, 0.0 49.7, 0.0 50.0, 0.0 50.0, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0
0.03 48.2 48.3 48.8 48.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 49.3, 0.0 48.9, 0.0 49.5, 0.0 49.7, 0.0 0.6, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.5, 0.0
0.1 44.7 45.4 46.3 46.4 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.5 46.3, 0.1 47.4, 0.1 48.6, 0.1 49.2, 0.1 0.7, 0.1 0.7, 0.1 0.6, 0.1 0.6, 0.1
0.3 35.5 38.5 40.3 40.9 5.7 5.3 5.1 5.0 39.3, 0.4 43.1, 0.3 46.0, 0.3 47.5, 0.3 1.8, 0.4 1.6, 0.4 1.4, 0.4 1.4, 0.4
Table 17. The loss that directly suppresses embedding shift dis-
tance with MNIST dataset.
Similarly, we follow the idea and use a similar defense
for ranking models:
min
θ
{
E(q,cp,cn)∼D
[
max
r∈Γ
Ltriplet(q + r, cp, cn)
]}
(19)
where the inner maximization aims to generate strongest ad-
versarial examples that could lead to triplet ranking error
and a large loss value, while the outer minimization seeks
network parameters that could reduce such error.
However, during experiments, we observe that such de-
fensive loss function always diverges, possibly due to the
adversarial examples generated by the inner problem being
too “strong”. We leave further investigation into this prob-
lem for future work.
H.2. Straightforward Adaptation of Ian Defense
Ian [21] proposed the following loss function for adver-
sarial training:
LIan(x, y) = αLCE(x, y) (20)
+ (1− α)LCE(x+ εsign(∇xLCE(x, y))) (21)
where the first term is a normal Cross-Entropy loss, and the
second term is the cross-entropy loss with untargeted adver-
sarial example that aims to increase the loss value. Constant
α is a balancing parameter.
When adapted to a deep ranking system, this defense
method also suffers from the diverging issue similar to
Madry’s defense.
H.3. Directly Suppressing Shift Distance
As discussed in the manuscript, another possible adver-
sarial training method could be to directly suppress the max-
imum shift distance of embedding vectors, i.e.:
Ltrip-es = Ltriplet(q, cp, cn)+
∑
x∈{q,cp,cn}
(
max
r∈Γ
d(x+r, x)
)
, (22)
where the most severe distance shift incurred by adversar-
ial perturbations is explicitly suppressed, in addition to a
standard ranking loss term.
Experimental results (Tab. 17) show that cosine distance-
based ranking models are more robust with this defense.
However, we note that this loss may numerically explode on
an Euclidean distance-based embedding model, as a strong
adversary can gradually cause very large embedding shift
distance. To mitigate such divergence issue, we also tried to
add a balancing parameter to greatly scale down the second
term of the loss function, but the instability problem was
still not alleviated.
Due to the lack of universality, we leave this alternative
defense in supplementary material as a pure discussion, and
possible improvements as future work.
